Nauthilus Operational Security Checklist
This checklist is intended for release readiness and recurring security operations in Production and Staging.
Usage
- Mark each item as done for both environments.
- Attach evidence (ticket, screenshot, log snippet, config diff, command output).
- Re-run this checklist before each major release and after security-relevant changes.
1. Backchannel Access Control
- Production: At least one backchannel auth method is enabled:
auth.backchannel.basic_auth.enabled=trueorauth.backchannel.oidc_bearer.enabled=true
- Staging: At least one backchannel auth method is enabled.
- Production:
/api/v1/*is reachable only from trusted internal networks. - Backchannel listeners (
/api/v1/*including the Policy API, and the gRPC authority listener) are not reachable from untrusted networks. A rejected caller is delayed and logged; with the HTTP rate middleware enabled, an address that exhausts its failure budget is refused on/api/v1until it refills. - Every backchannel caller holds only the scopes of the routes it uses. Each route family answers to its own
scopes (
nauthilus:authenticatefor/api/v1/auth/*and the management OpenAPI documents,nauthilus:security_readfor brute-force and OIDC-session listings,nauthilus:security_writefor cache and brute-force flushes and OIDC-session deletion, either of them for the status of an asynchronous job, the MFA and WebAuthn scopes for/api/v1/mfa-backchannel/*, the support scopes for/api/v1/support/*); no route asks for a scope of another family.nauthilus:securityincludes both security scopes, andnauthilus:adminis accepted on the security and MFA routes as well; neither opens the authentication endpoints or the support routes. Grant these two only where the narrower scope does not suffice. See OIDC Bearer Access. - Basic callers use scoped credentials under
auth.backchannel.basic_auth.users, one per person or tool. The unrestricted credential (auth.backchannel.basic_auth.usernameandpassword) grants full management access and is announced with a warning at startup; remove it where scoped credentials or Bearer tokens suffice. See Backchannel Basic Credentials. - Backchannel credentials (Basic passwords, Policy-Basic passwords, and OIDC
client_credentialsclient secrets or keys) are high-entropy. - Alerts watch
backchannel_caller_auth_total{outcome=~"rejected|unavailable"}. -
auth.pipeline.max_concurrent_requestsis sized for the backchannel peak. On the caller-authenticated backchannel API (/api/v1/auth/*,/api/v1/cache/*,/api/v1/bruteforce/*, the management OpenAPI documents, and the other routes behindauth.backchannel), the per-client-IP HTTP rate limit (runtime.servers.http.middlewares.ratewithruntime.servers.http.rate_limit.per_secondandburst) is a failure budget: requests whose Basic or Bearer caller authentication succeeds never consume it, because a few proxy or load balancer addresses carry all backchannel traffic. The shared HTTP/gRPC request budget is the process-wide bound for these callers. - Every failed caller authentication on these routes (missing or wrong credentials, a caller without
nauthilus:authenticateon the routes that require it, missingauth.backchannelconfiguration) and every request to theauth.basicendpoint consumes one token of the client address. An undecided token validation (503) does not. Within the budget a failure is answered with401or403after the rejection delay. Once the address has no token left, every request from it, including requests with valid credentials, is answered with429(scope: rate) immediately and without evaluating credentials, until the budget refills atper_second. Credential guessing is therefore bounded per address toburstattempts plusper_secondattempts per second on average; concurrent failures that pass the check together are all charged and delay the refill. - Callers that share an address with a misconfigured or hostile client lose backchannel access while that
client exhausts the budget. Watch
backchannel_caller_auth_total{outcome="rejected"}and429answers withratelimit_reason=rateon/api/v1, and fix failing callers promptly. Routes without backchannel caller authentication, such as the IdP, the frontend, the Policy API, custom hooks, and backchannel routes of a developer-mode server withoutauth.backchannel, keep the per-client-IP limit for every request. -
/oidc/tokenand/oidc/introspecthave no per-address brake for client-secret guessing; guessing there is limited by network exposure and upstream rate limits. - With
runtime.servers.http.haproxy_v2enabled, the listener accepts PROXY headers from every TCP peer and logs use the PROXY source, so the listener is reachable only from the PROXY-speaking load balancers. - Staging:
/api/v1/*is not publicly exposed.
Evidence:
- Config snapshot attached
- Network policy / firewall rule attached
2. Metrics Endpoint Access Control
- Production: If
/metricsis exposed beyond a private scrape network, dedicated metrics Basic Auth is enabled:observability.metrics.endpoint_auth.basic.enabled=true
- Staging:
/metricsexposure is documented and protected when it crosses trust boundaries. - Prometheus uses dedicated metrics credentials, not backchannel API credentials.
- Bearer/OIDC authentication is not used for
/metrics.
Evidence:
- Metrics scrape config attached
- Network policy / firewall rule attached
3. OIDC Token Endpoint Hardening
- Production:
identity.oidc.tokens.token_endpoint_allow_get=false - Staging:
identity.oidc.tokens.token_endpoint_allow_get=false - Any temporary GET enablement has a documented exception owner and expiration date.
Evidence:
- Config diff attached
- Exception ticket (if applicable)
4. Configuration Endpoint Exposure
- Production:
runtime.servers.http.disabled_endpoints.configuration=trueunless explicitly required. - Staging: Configuration endpoint exposure is justified and documented.
- If enabled, access is restricted and audited.
Evidence:
- Endpoint accessibility test attached
- Audit log sample attached
5. CSP and Security Headers
- Production: CSP keeps default
form-action 'self' https:unlessform_action_optional_urisis intentionally used. - Staging: Any CSP widening (for redirects/dev compatibility) is explicitly documented.
- Security headers are enabled under
identity.frontend.security_headers.
Evidence:
- Response header capture attached
- Config snippet attached
6. Developer Mode Controls
- Production:
NAUTHILUS_DEVELOPER_MODE=false - Staging:
NAUTHILUS_DEVELOPER_MODE=falseunless explicitly needed for a short test window. - Startup/runtime guardrails prevent accidental non-loopback developer mode usage.
Evidence:
- Deployment env vars attached
- Startup log excerpt attached
7. Network and Redis Hardening
- Redis is not publicly reachable.
- Redis authentication and TLS are configured where applicable.
- Redis ACLs follow least privilege.
-
runtime.servers.http.trusted_proxiesis explicitly configured (no broad trust).
Evidence:
- Redis bind/ACL config attached
- Proxy trust config attached
8. Secrets and Key Management
- No secrets in repository or plaintext deployment artifacts.
- OIDC signing keys have a rotation process and owner.
- Client secrets have rotation and revocation procedures.
Evidence:
- Secret management policy attached
- Rotation record attached
9. Runtime Hardening
- Service runs non-root (
run_as_user,run_as_group) where supported. - Optional debug endpoints (for example pprof) are disabled in production.
- Only required endpoints are enabled.
Evidence:
- Runtime/service config attached
- Endpoint inventory attached
10. Logging, Detection, and Alerting
- Security-relevant logs are centralized.
- Alerts exist for:
- repeated auth failures / brute-force patterns
- unusual 401/403 spikes
- token validation and scope-denial anomalies
- Alert ownership and on-call routing are documented.
Evidence:
- Alert rule export attached
- Recent alert test attached
11. CI/CD Security Gates
-
govulncheckis mandatory for merges tomain. - Dependency update policy is active (scheduled updates, review owner).
- SBOM generation/verification is part of release flow.
Evidence:
- CI workflow link attached
- Last successful run attached
12. Backup and Recovery
- Backup/restore procedures exist for config, keys, and stateful dependencies.
- Restore drills are executed on a schedule.
- Security incident rollback procedure is tested.
Evidence:
- Drill report attached
- Recovery runbook attached
13. Independent Validation
- External security assessment (pentest/blackbox) is planned or completed.
- Findings are tracked to closure.
- High-severity findings are converted into automated regression tests.
Evidence:
- Assessment report attached
- Tracking ticket list attached
Sign-off
- Release/Change ID:
- Environment:
- Reviewer:
- Date:
- Result:
PASS/PASS WITH EXCEPTIONS/FAIL